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The Lisbon Strategy 
Paper prepared for a panel discussion 
Michele Chang 
Professor, European Political and Administrative Studies,  
College of Europe, Bruges 
 
In March 2000 the European Council launched the Lisbon strategy, the purpose of 
which was to create “the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the 
world, capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater 
social cohesion."  This paper will trace the development of the Lisbon strategy from its 
inception until the present day, highlighting the essential points of debate in terms of the 
strategy’s contribution to the EU’s competitiveness, social objectives, and democratic 
legitimacy.   
The distinguishing feature of the Lisbon strategy was the Open Method of 
Coordination (OMC), an intergovernmental form of cooperation that employed soft law. 
Hodson & Maher
1 described the OMC as s a “heterarchical, decentred and dynamic 
process [that] supports and radicalizes the principle of subsidiarity, offers an alternative to 
treaty rules on enhanced co-operation, and addresses some of the legitimacy issues” 
(p719).  Though these soft law mechanisms had existed and been implemented in the 
previously outlined initiatives on employment, the OMC would be extended to new issue 
areas such as social policy, R&D, and macroeconomic policy, as well as maintaining its 
use in employment policy.  The distinguishing feature of the OMC was that nation states 
would retain the ability to make policy decisions, and legislation at the Community level 
                                                 
1 Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher, “The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The Case 
of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 2001, pp. 719-
746 
 
  3was “explicitly excluded.” 
2  In 2001 sustainable development was added to the Lisbon 
agenda’s objectives at the Gothenburg summit. 
Member States jointly identified and defined common objectives, and the 
Commission monitored progress towards achieving these goals.  Member States 
implemented these objectives through the development of National Action Programmes 
(NAPs).  The NAPs would not only encourage policymaking coordination at the EU level, 
they would engage various economic and social actors at the EU and domestic levels.  
Benchmarking, naming and shaming, and peer pressure were the mechanisms used to 
promote compliance.     
The Lisbon strategy was welcomed for its innovative approach to integration.  In 
particular, this new form of governance could lead to enhanced cooperation and improve 
legitimacy problems of the EU by involving more social actors in the policy process, thus 
creating a dialogue as well as aggregating diverse preferences at multiple levels.
3  
Moreover, integration via the OMC was seen as less threatening to Member States that 
were averse to further integration, as the states retained their ability to direct and 
implement the economic and social policies associated with it.
4  For example, Member 
                                                 
2 Fritz Scharpf, “The European Social Model: Coping with the Challenges of Diversity” MPIfG 
Working Paper 2002 
3 See James S. Mosher, “Open Method of Coordination: Functional and Political Origins”, ECSA 
Review, 31, 2000;  Maurizio Ferrera, Anton Hemerijk and Martin Rhodes, The Future of Social 
Europe: Recasting Work and Welfare in the New Economy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001; Dermot Hodson and Imelda Maher, “The Open Method as a New Mode of Governance: The 
Case of Soft Economic Policy Co-ordination”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 39, 2001, 
pp.719-746; Joshua Cohen and Charles Sabel, “Sovereignty and Solidarity: EU and US” in 
Jonathan Zeitlin and David Trubek (editors), Governing work and Welfare in a New Economy: 
European and American Experiments. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; Burkard Eberlein 
and Dieter Kerwer, “New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical Perspective”, Journal 
of Common Market Studies, 42, 2004, pp.121-142; Kerstin Jacobsson, “Soft Regulation and the 
Subtle Transformation of States: The Case of EU Employment Policy”, Journal of European Social 
Policy, 14, 2004, pp.355-370. 
4 Oliver Gerstenberg and Charles F. Sable, “Directively-Deliberative Polyarchy: An Institutional 
Ideal for Europe?” www2.law.columbia.edu/sable/papers/gerst-sabel1029.doc, 2000; Christoph O. 
Meyer, “The Hard Side of Soft Policy Co-ordination in EMU: The Impact of Peer Pressure on 
Publicized Opinion in the Cases of Germany and Ireland”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 
Michele Chang    4 States are loath to harmonize their different welfare models, but the OMC allowed for a 
dialogue that encouraged convergence without necessitating harmonization.
5 
However, the Lisbon strategy and the OMC also faced detractors in regards to 
effectiveness, legitimacy, and policy outcomes.  In terms of the effectiveness of the OMC, 
it is unclear whether or not soft law promotes further cooperation.  Its voluntary nature 
makes it difficult to ascertain if reforms were undertaken as a result of policy learning or if 
they would have been adopted anyway.  It is also unclear if policy learning via the OMC is 
even realistic; while the business world has successfully employed peer review and 
benchmarking techniques to improve performance, applying such strategies at the level of 
international policy is difficult.
6  Governments do not possess the same type of resources 
as multinational corporations, and the Lisbon Strategy’s budget does not provide sufficient 
funds to rectify this situation, thus limiting the prospects for innovative policy to emerge.
7  
Though it was originally touted as making the policy process more democratic via the 
social dialogue, the OMC can be criticized for exacerbating the legitimacy problem due to 
the lack of transparency in the process, the limited role that civil society plays in practice,
8 
and the muted role for the more democratic institutions of the EU (like the European 
Parliament) and of national governments (national parliaments).
9  Indeed, accountability is 
quite difficult in a system that easily conflates decision-making with implementing 
                                                                                                                                                    
2004, pp.814 - 83 
5 Caroline de la Porte, “Is the Open Method of Coordination Appropriate for Organising Activities 
at European Level in Sensitive Policy Areas?” European Law Journal, 8, 2002, pp.38-58 
6 Martin Lodge, “The Importance of Being Modern: International Benchmarking and National 
Regulatory Innovation”, Journal of European Public Policy, 12, 2005, pp.649-667 
7 James Arrowsmith, Keith Sisson, and Paul Marginson, “What Can 'Benchmarking' Offer the 
Open Method of Co-ordination?” Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 2004, pp.311-328 
8 Mary Daly, “EU Social Policy after Lisbon”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, 2006, 
pp.461-481 
9 Susana Borrás and Kerstin Jacobsson, “The Open Method of Co-Ordination and New Governance 
Patterns in the EU”, Journal of European Public Policy, 11, 2004, pp.185-208; Erika Szyszczak, 
“Experimental Governance: The Open Method of Coordination”, European Law Journal, 12, 2006, 
pp.486-502 
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10  Rather than a more participatory system, the OMC encourages the development 
of technocratic elite.
11  The Court plays only a marginal role, as do the European 
Parliament and the national parliaments.   Finally, the Lisbon Agenda could have negative 
effects on integration itself if the EU sets ambitious policies that it is unable to achieve.
12  
In March 2004, the Commission conducted a mid-term progress report of the 
Lisbon strategy.  The Lisbon strategy did not deliver bear fruit: sluggish growth (about half 
the rate on which the strategy itself had been based) and high unemployment (almost 9 
percent) prompted a major reform.  The Commission proposed the “rigorous prioritisation” 
of the project, focusing on economic growth and employment.  The Council invited the 
Commission to set up a High Level Group to contribute an independent-analysis to the 
mid-term review, the results of which were published in November 2004 and is known as 
the Kok Report.  This report criticized the lack of progress made during the preceding 
years, noting the “disappointing delivery” that resulted from “an overloaded agenda, poor 
co-ordination and conflicting priorities.”  Ultimately, however, the Member States failed to 
rise to the task.  Like the Commission report, the Kok Report emphasized the lack of 
ownership, stating “Lisbon is about everything and thus about nothing.  Everybody is 
responsible and thus no one.”  The following priorities were suggested: increasing the 
adaptability of workers and enterprises; bringing more people into the labour market; 
investing more in human capital, both quantitatively and qualitatively; and devising better 
governance procedures in regards to the implementation of reforms.  Finally, “the High 
Level Group advises the EU and Member States to focus on growth and employment in 
order to underpin social cohesion and sustainable development.”  The strategy needed “to 
                                                 
10 Claudio M. Radaelli, “The Open Method of Co-ordination--A New Governance Architecture for 
the European Union”, Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies, 1, 2003 
11 Burkard Eberlein and Dieter Kerwer, “New Governance in the European Union: A Theoretical 
Perspective”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 42, 2004, pp.121-142  
12 Michael Zängle, “The European Union Benchmarking Experience. From Euphoria to Fatigue? . 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP) 8, 2004, pp.1-22 
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level of the EU.
13  
In February 2005 the Commission proposed a new Lisbon strategy that emphasized 
jobs and growth (COM (2005) 24 of 2.2.2005).  In March the European Council officially 
launched the Growth and Employment Strategy (also known as Lisbon II), whose 
ambitions were scaled back substantially, calling for a focus on growth, innovation and 
employment.  The social and environmental elements of the original agenda would still be 
encouraged, but it signalled an even greater shift in the EU’s priorities towards market-
oriented policies.   
Institutionally, this would be done through a partnership between the EU 
institutions (specifically the Commission) and the Member States.  A Community Lisbon 
Programme set common goals for the Member States, and National Reform Programmes 
(which replaced National Action Programmes) implemented them at the national level.  
This marks a departure from the original Lisbon strategy in several respects.  First, it shifts 
the focus away from the intergovernmentalism of its predecessor.  Though the OMC 
remains as a mechanism for coordination, Lisbon II envisions more interaction between 
Member States and Community institutions, in particular granting the Commission a larger 
role.  Second, Lisbon II significantly streamlines the previous system at the EU and the 
national level.  At the EU level, Lisbon II’s Integrated Guidelines unite the broad economic 
policy guidelines (BEPGs), employment guidelines, and microeconomic guidelines into a 
single set of recommendations.  At the national level, the NRPs consolidated the previous 
NAPs that had been fragmented.  They thus form a single programme for each Member 
State, encouraging greater policy coherence across agencies and levels of governance.  A 
                                                 
13 Wim Kok, Jobs, Jobs, Jobs: Creating More Employment in Europe Brussels, Employment 
Taskforce, 2003 
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induce change.  The political difficulty of publicly criticizing Member States led to the 
Commission producing reports that encourage rather than censure, prompting some 
detractors to claim that it reduces its political relevance and makes it difficult for Member 
States to constructively learn from the process without adequate feedback.
14    
Additional weaknesses of the revised strategy include a lack of political visibility 
and the need to increase incentives (or sanctions) for complying with Community 
objectives.
15  While in some Member States the Lisbon strategy has enjoyed a certain 
amount of political prominence, in other states it is absent from the policy debate, thus 
impeding its efforts to be a mechanism for change at the domestic level.  In addition, the 
Community has been given neither the financial resources to actively support the CLPs nor 
the means to sanction states who fail to implement them. 
Since the CLP was established in July 2005, a variety of proposals have been 
generated but few innovations have been made.  Member States have referred to the CLPs 
in their NRPs to varying degrees as well, making it difficult to assess what its impact will 
be.  The involvement of societal actors has also differed across states, with systems 
accustomed to accommodating such interests typically doing so in this regard as well, 
while others seldom consult societal actors. 
Thus some key questions for discussion include:   
1.  How does the Lisbon agenda contribute to policy innovation and reform, if at all?   
2.  Is there a value-added to handling this at the Community level?   
                                                 
14 Iain Begg, “Lisbon Relaunched: What Has Changed?  Is It Working Better?”  Brussels: Special 
CEPS Report, 2006 
15 ibid. 
Michele Chang    8 3.  If the answer is affirmative, how can the EU encourage the accountability of 
Member States without resorting to the “naming and shaming” that it has thus far 
been reluctant to use?  How can we enhance ownership? 
4.  Should civil society be more engaged in this process, and how could this be 
promoted across Member States with different political traditions? 
5.  The emphasis on jobs and growth has pushed social and environmental concerns 
down the list of the EU’s priorities.  Was this necessary? 
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Paper prepared for a panel discussion 
Eric de Souza 
Professor, European Economic Studies, College of Europe, Bruges 
 
During the first fifty years of its existence, the European Economic Community 
(EEC) evolved into the European Community (EC) and the European Union (EU) − from 
now on we shall refer to it as the EU, even if this is at times anachronistic − as well as 
enlarged in size from 6 to 27 Member States. In spite of continuous fears, it did not 
sacrifice “deepening” its institutions and policies to “widening” its geographical scope. In 
this short note, I shall concentrate mainly on the economic aspects of enlargement. To 
begin with, I shall examine the change in the political and economic characteristics of the 
Member States applying for EU membership (the enlargement process). I shall then look at 
how this affected the negotiations preceding membership and the entry requirements (the 
enlargement strategy). Next I shall analyse the benefits and costs resulting from the two 
most recent enlargements (2004 and 2007), both for the incumbent Member States (EU15) 
and for those who joined. Finally, I shall consider the prospects for future enlargements in 
the light of what is described as “enlargement fatigue” and what alternatives are on offer. 
 
1. The Enlargement Process 
The European Economic Community started in 1958 with six Member States that 
were relatively homogeneous both from a political-institutional and from an economic 
point of view. Diversity did exist, but this occurred within the Member States. The one 
possible exception was Italy with its large mezzogiorno which was accorded special 
treatment: the European Investment Bank was created with the south of Italy in mind. 
There then followed six enlargements: 
Eric de Souza      101 Jan. 1973  first enlargement (UK, Denmark, Ireland) 
1 Jan. 1981  second enlargement (Greece) 
1 Jan 1986  third enlargement (Spain , Portugal) 
1 Jan. 1995  fourth enlargement (Sweden, Finland, Austria) 
1 May 2004  fifth enlargement (Malta, Cyprus and the CEECs: Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia) 
1 Jan 2007  sixth enlargement (Bulgaria, Romania). 
 
Each of these enlargements affected the EU in a different way. The first and fourth 
enlargements involved countries that were not too dissimilar in their political, economic 
and social structures to the EU they joined. Although diversity in cultures and habits was 
not denied, the fundamental feeling of belonging to one people remained. This is not to say 
that these enlargements had no effect. To list a few, the Regional Development Fund was 
created at the instigation of the United Kingdom,  the 1995 enlargement led to a greater 
transparency in the functioning of the EU institutions, and the Eastern enlargement has 
forced, and is still requires, long needed reforms in the Common Agricultural Policy. 
The second and third enlargements saw the entry of countries which had a much 
lower standard of living and had emerged from authoritarian regimes a decade or less 
earlier. Whilst Spain and Portugal experienced rapid economic development and 
adaptation of their socio-economic structures, Greece became the “sick man of Europe”. 
Indeed, the Commission had felt that Greece was not yet a suitable candidate for 
membership but was overridden by the Council. It was only in the second half of the 1990s 
that the situation changed for the better. Greece is catching up quickly. 
With the fall of the communist regimes in Central Eastern Europe, these countries 
began a transition to market economies with democratic institutions. In order to encourage 
the transition to a more Western European type of political and economic system, 
membership in the EU was offered them at the Copenhagen European Council of June 
1993 but under relatively strict conditions. Bulgaria and Romania, the last two countries to 
Eric de Souza      11accede to the EU, have a GDP per capita in purchasing power standards (PPS) equal to one 
third of the EU25 average. 
The successive enlargements of the E(E)C/EU did not put a stop to the deepening 
of its policies, in spite of fears of its developing in the direction of a free trade area. The 
EU has not only deepened − if not yet completely achieved − its internal market but has 
also established a monetary union among almost half of its members with almost all of the 
others preparing for monetary union. And even though the economic policies of the Union 
are still dominant, its competences have been greatly extended in a number of other 
directions. All this, of course, requires that much more attention be paid to the conditions 
for accession to the EU. 
 
2. The Enlargement Strategy. 
The diverse nature of the countries aspiring to membership of the EU, the fear of 
being overwhelmed by the problems of the aspiring Member States, and the increased 
deepening of the EU led to an evolution in the requirements for accession. This change is 
already reflected in the Treaty (compare Article 237 of the original Treaty of Rome with 
Article 49 of the (consolidated version of the) Treaty on the EU).  
The new attitude towards candidates for membership of the EU was clearly 
expressed at the Copenhagen European Council of June 1993 in the four Copenhagen 
criteria, to which the Madrid European Council of December 1995 added a fifth. These 
criteria are (i) stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and, protection of minorities, (ii) existence of a functioning market 
economy, (iii) capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces within the 
Union, (iv) ability to take on the obligations of membership including adherence to the 
Eric de Souza      12aims of political, economic and monetary union, and (v)  administrative capacity 
guaranteeing the effective implementation of the acquis. These decisions were applied 
through the Europe Agreements and the other Association Agreements. The Union's 
capacity to absorb new members, while maintaining the momentum of European 
integration, was also considered to be important in the general interest of both the Union 
and the candidate countries. This relatively tough attitude was meant to ensure that the 
candidate countries were more or less prepared to function properly when they became 
members of the EU. In certain areas, transitional arrangements were allowed after the 
candidate countries actually became Member States. Thus, for the incumbent Member 
States, free movement of workers could be restricted for up to seven years after accession. 
Nevertheless, one can question whether imposing the entire acquis 
indiscriminately, albeit with transition periods for certain issues, was the appropriate 
manner to proceed. Would a more rational approach not have been to define a core acquis 
without which the EU could not function properly and to require that these be implemented 
prior to or at accession. For instance, the costs of implementing all the environmental 
directives are large and affect the competitiveness of the recently acceded Member States. 
One can also ask whether the implementation of EU health and safety rules in the 
workplace in all their detail do not impose unbearable costs on small and medium-sized 
enterprises in these countries (see also below under “costs of membership”). For countries 
with low income per capita the costs of such measures are tremendous. 
Similarly, the pre-conditions for joining the monetary union − the convergence 
criteria laid down at Maastricht − will probably create unnecessary pressures on the 
economic development and catching-up of the recently acceded Member States. It is well 
known that capital inflows are an integral part of the catch-up or economic convergence 
process; but also that these capital inflows can cause great instability because of their 
Eric de Souza      13volatility. Furthermore, the same countries experience an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate, either in the form of an appreciating nominal exchange rate or inflation, in the course 
of economic convergence and catch-up (the Balassa-Samuelson effect). This will 
complicate the achievement of both low inflation and exchange rate stability. On the other 
hand, the excessive deficits criteria will help to bring about the required discipline in 
public spending and taxation. 
 
3. Benefits and Costs of Enlargement. 
It cannot be stressed enough that the benefits of enlargement far outweigh the costs 
for the recently acceded Member States, and to a certain extent for the incumbent Member 
States. However, the debate on enlargement has been dominated by the cost side. 
3.1 Benefits for the Recently Acceded Member States. 
The benefits for the recently acceded Member States are too numerous to list 
completely here. I shall limit myself to the CEECs and only stress the most important 
benefits. Membership of the EU served as a compass keeping the CEECs on the path of 
democratic and economic reform. Without such reforms, political, economic and social 
turmoil would have resulted. 
Next in line come the gains from increased trade, the elimination of barriers to 
trade and incorporation into the Single Market of the EU. 
Equal in importance to the increase in trade was the increase in inward foreign 
direct investment which the countries direly needed for their economic development. 
Foreign ownership was often perceived negatively in the receiving countries, but without 
such ownership foreign investment would not have been forthcoming in sufficient 
Eric de Souza      14amounts. Nor would it have occurred without the market oriented economic reforms and 
political stability imposed by the Copenhagen criteria. 
One should also not forget the benefits from the macroeconomic policies 
introduced in order to qualify for membership in the monetary union: fiscal discipline, low 
inflation, exchange rate stability with the principal trading partners. 
Of much less importance are the structural funds which has attracted the most 
attention in several recently acceded Member States. This is not to deny their importance, 
but rather to relativise them. 
3.2 Benefits for the Other Member States. 
What benefits do the incumbent Member States draw from enlargement?  The 
primary benefit is political, economic and social stability in surrounding countries. Peace, 
security and stability were the original motives for the creation of the European Economic 
Community. They remain important. Not only do the Member States benefit from them but 
also countries such as Norway and Switzerland. 
The economic weight of the recently acceded Member States is small. The 
immediate gains from enlargement for the EU15 will, therefore, be small. However, over a 
longer time horizon the gains should not be under-estimated: as the recently acceded 
Member States converge in economic terms towards the incumbent Member States, the 
gains, both static and dynamic, from belonging to the same internal market will rise. 
The recent enlargement will also exert pressure for economic reform in the 
incumbent Member States, mainly in the fields of the common agricultural policy and 
structural reform of goods and labour markets. These reforms are necessary for higher 
economic growth and lower unemployment rates in the incumbent Member States. 
Eric de Souza      15One should not neglect the benefits resulting from actual (for Slovenia) and future 
(for the other countries) membership in the monetary union. Especially, for small 
countries, sharing a common currency and a common central bank with ones main trading 
partners has a number of advantages. 
3.3 Costs for the Recently Acceded Member States. 
Although enlargement is mainly about benefits, especially for the recently acceded 
Member States, there is no denying that there are also costs involved. These costs are 
twofold in nature resulting, on the one hand, from the costs of transition to a market 
economy with democratic institutions; and, on the other hand, the costs resulting from the 
political and economic management of this transition. What is of concern to us here are the 
costs imposed unnecessarily by the conditions of membership in EU. They have already 
been mentioned previously. 
These costs result, first of all, from the imposition of the acquis communautaire 
without a proper consideration of sequencing its introduction on the basis of 
indispensability for the correct functioning of the EU and the consequences of its 
introduction for the recently acceded Member States. To the extent that measures have 
purely or almost entirely domestic effect and the cost of their implementation is high, they 
should have been introduced slowly. These measures concern, for instance, the 
introduction of (Western European) labour market or social policy rigidities (because of 
the fear of what has been called social dumping), and various health, safety and 
environmental directives. 
The road to monetary union for the recently acceded Member States (with the 
exception of Slovenia which has joined the monetary union since 1 January 2007) can be 
fraught with dangers if the appropriate policies are not followed. The main potential 
Eric de Souza      16problems lie in the volatility of capital flows, credit boom risks and macroeconomic booms 
(overheating) caused by low interest rates. 
3.4 Costs for the Other Member States. 
The main costs that have been put forward for the incumbent Member States are 
associated with labour either in the form of competition through low wages or because of 
migration from the less prosperous CEECs to the much more prosperous incumbent 
Member States. The costs associated with migratory labour forces in the form of wage 
competition are probably exaggerated. The host country principle limits the extent to such 
competition can occur: laws and regulations of the host country apply to all labour in the 
country even if migrant. Increasing the transition period for the application of free 
movement of workers for too long, however, may lead to illegal migration and in practice 
undermine the principle. 
What about the costs associated with competition resulting from low wages in the 
recently acceded Member States? It should first be remembered that what counts is unit 
labour costs, namely, labour costs taking into account levels of productivity. Nevertheless, 
given the high levels of education in the recently acceded Member States, productivity 
levels will quickly catch up. But then so will wage levels. 
 
4. Prospects and Perceptions of Further Enlargements. 
Croatia and Turkey are already candidate countries with which accession 
negotiations have started. Macedonia has been admitted as a candidate country but 
accession negotiations are still to begin. The other Western Balkan countries (Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Serbia including Kosovo) are potential 
candidates to whom comittments, although still vague and not definitive, have been made. 
Eric de Souza      17It is most likely that the EU frontiers will stop there even though several other countries 
have made it clear that they will apply for membership. 
The European Union is said to be suffering from “enlargement fatigue”. There is a 
general perception that a pause is necessary before new Member States are accepted as 
candidates, and that actual candidates should be subjected to a tougher examination. This 
perception goes hand in hand with the feeling that the whole EU process is elite-driven. 
The Treaty clearly limits to enlargement to European states. Should Europe be 
defined in geographical terms (and even this criterion is not clear-cut), or should it be 
defined in cultural terms? And what does one understand by cultural? Is religion to be 
included in the cultural reference, especially in modern European society? 
In lieu of membership in the Union, other forms of association have been proposed. 
But these have been discussed in another session. 
By way of conclusion, let me put the following thought to you: just imagine what 
the situation could have been in Europe today if the gate to the EU had not been opened to 
the CEECs. Was there really any other option? 
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Over the past fifty years the European Union (EU) has developed a series of 
external policy instruments to promote its interests and values: from trade and development 
cooperation to the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the more recent crisis 
management tools of the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). The European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), launched in 2003, touches on all these dimensions. Its cross-
pillar nature and its application to sixteen immediate neighbours (i.e., all except Russia, the 
EFTA states and the candidate countries) have made the ENP a key priority within EU 
external relations.
16 Plagued by 'enlargement fatigue', the EU's new flagship policy is 
likely to dominate European foreign policy for many years to come. The current German 
Presidency as well as of the subsequent Portuguese and Slovene Presidencies have 
declared the strengthening of the ENP a main concern.  
This discussion paper sets out why, how and with what chances of success the 
Union is developing this new external action and identifies a number of future challenges. 
 
1. Goals 
The EU already has bilateral agreements in place with most of its neighbouring 
countries (see Annex, Table 1) such as, since the late 1990s, the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) in the East and the association agreements (AAs) in the 
                                                 
16  See also the "special relationship with neighbouring countries (…) founded on the values of the 
Union" introduced by the Constitutional Treaty (article I-57).  
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yet another European policy?  
With its enlargements of 2004 and 2007, the Union extended its external borders to 
some very troubled and poor regions in the world. The objective of the ENP is "to avoid 
drawing new dividing lines in Europe and to promote stability and prosperity within and 
beyond the new borders of the Union".
17 At the same time, the European Security Strategy 
of 2003 stressed the need "to promote a ring of well governed countries to the East of the 
European Union and on the borders of the Mediterranean".
18 Hence, with the ENP the EU 
aims at 'exporting' its values (the rule of law, good governance, the respect for human 
rights, the principles of market economy and sustainable development) into its near 
abroad.
19 However, this new relationship "would not, in the medium-term, include a 
perspective of membership or a role in the Union's institutions".
20  
In the words of the Commissioner for External Relations, "the question is how to 
use our soft power to leverage the kinds of reforms" that would make it possible "to 
expand the zone of prosperity, stability and security beyond our borders".
21 
 
2. Instruments 
Building on existing bilateral treaties, the Commission initially presents a country 
report to the Council, on the basis of which the Council decides whether to negotiate an 
                                                 
17  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament, Wider Europe – Neighbourhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern 
and Southern Neighbours, COM(2003) 104, 11 March 2003, p. 4. 
18  European Council, European Security Strategy, "A Secure Europe in a Better World", Brussels, 
12 December 2003, p. 8. 
19    European Commission, Communication from the Commission, European Neighbourhood 
Policy – Strategy Paper, COM(2004) 373, 12 May 2004, p. 3. 
20  European Commission, Wider Europe, op.cit., p. 5 
21   Benita Ferrero-Waldner, "The European Neighbourhood Policy: The EU's Newest Foreign 
Policy Instrument", European Foreign Affairs Review, 11(2), 2006, p. 139. 
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for the next 3 to 5 years, featuring the same chapters for each country but tailor-made 
contents. The action plans are adopted by the Commission, endorsed by the Council and 
approved by the relevant Cooperation or Association Council set up under the PCAs and 
AAs, respectively (see Annex, Table 2). The European Parliament is not consulted at any 
stage but merely informed. The implementation of the action plans is monitored through 
the relevant bodies and subcommittees set up under the respective agreements. In addition, 
the Commission prepares progress reports, with input from the country concerned, the 
High Representative for the CFSP as well as international organisations.  
Drawing on its 'soft power', the EU intends to apply two important principles: 
conditionality ensures that it may withhold certain 'carrots' and apply certain 'sticks' if a 
country does not fulfil certain conditions. All Euro-Med agreements and PCAs, for 
instance, as well as the EU's aid regulations feature a suspension clause. Second, according 
to the principle of differentiation, partner countries are assessed individually and the 
extent of cooperation offered to them depends on the degree to which they effectively 
share European norms: "In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and 
effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, including 
aligning legislation with the acquis, the EU’s neighbourhood should benefit from the 
prospect of closer economic integration with the EU", in particular the prospect of 'a stake 
in the EU's Internal Market'.
22  
In addition, the Union uses two types of instruments to change the behaviour of 
neighbouring countries (see Table 3): on the one hand, incentives for domestic reforms 
that affect their cost-benefit calculations and lead to adaptation (e.g. improved market 
access, more aid), and on the other hand, deliberative instruments that aim at promoting 
                                                 
22  European Commission, Wider Europe, op.cit., p. 10. 
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socialisation and persuasion (e.g. 'joint ownership' of the process with a shared setting of 
reform priorities and monitoring of their implementation, dialogue on different levels). 
Hence, ENP countries adopt EU norms either because they want to obtain the rewards that 
come with such a 'policy import' (or avoid the costs of non-compliance) or because they 
begin to view these norms as appropriate and legitimate.  
 
Table 1: ENP instruments of 'policy export' 
 
  incentives deliberation 
positive  
('carrots') 
preferential trade, technical 
assistance, financial aid, 'stake in the 
internal market', inter-connected 
infrastructure, EU participation in 
regional conflict resolution, etc. [EU 
membership] 
'joint ownership', political dialogue, 
legal approximation, twinning, 
TAIEX (Technical Assistance and 
Information Exchange), people-to-
people exchanges, etc.  
negative  
('sticks') 
suspension of aid or trade 
preferences etc., economic or 
political sanctions, delay of 
negotiations  
suspension of dialogue or expert 
assistance etc., 'naming and 
shaming', peer pressure  
 
It is evident from this table that – despite denying any membership perspective – the 
ENP was moulded in the Commission's DG Enlargement before being transferred to DG 
External Relations. The policy uses many instruments from the enlargement toolbox, and 
the ENP action plans indeed resemble the Accession Partnerships.  
 
3. Chances of Success 
Even if it may be too early to assess the impact of the still young European 
Neighbourhood Policy, a certain East-South divide appears likely in the medium term, as 
set out below. With regard to incentives, the Union is likely to achieve more in the South 
than in the East as the longstanding market economies in the Mediterranean have to a large 
extent already realised free trade and are eager to move further, whereas the Eastern 
Sieglinde Gstöhl        22transition economies have remained on the level of WTO treatment and still need to build 
up their institutional and administrative capacities. By contrast, deliberation centred on 
European norms is likely to work better with the Eastern than with the Southern 
neighbours in that the authoritarian Arab regimes appear less receptive to (especially 
political) EU norms than the ex-Communist Eastern countries which have been relatively 
open to new ideas since their previous political and economic systems were discredited.
23  
As regards incentives, the South's medium-term perspective for economic progress is 
more promising than that of the East. Twelve years since the launch of the Barcelona 
Process bilateral free trade for industrial goods has largely been achieved (the target date 
being a Euro-Med free trade area by 2010). However, the EMP has not had a significant 
economic impact since it neglected areas of key importance for fostering growth in the 
Mediterranean region such as agriculture, services and investments.
24 The ENP, which 
does not replace but complements the multilateral EMP, has provided new impetus to this 
process.
 25 In 2006 negotiations on liberalising trade in agricultural and fisheries products 
as well as in services have been launched with some Mediterranean countries. In addition, 
the offer of 'a stake in the internal market' goes much further than trade, tackling many 
behind-the-border issues: the free movement of capital and persons as well as horizontal 
policies such as competition, intellectual property rights or government procurement rules. 
                                                 
23  Socialisation research indeed suggests that persuasion is more likely if the target is in a novel 
and uncertain environment, has few ingrained beliefs inconsistent with the socialising institution 
and wants to belong to the latter. See Jeffrey Checkel, "International Institutions and 
Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework", International Organization, 59(4), 2005, 
p. 813. In the long run, the East may well catch up economically if the EU really applies its 
principles of conditionality and differentiation. 
24   Cf. Bernard Hoekman, "From Euro-Med Partnership to European Neighborhood: Deeper 
Integration à la Carte and Economic Development", Working Paper, 103, Cairo, Egyptian 
Center for Economic Studies, 2005; Daniel Müller-Jentsch, Deeper Integration and Trade in 
Services in the Euro-Mediterranean Region: Southern Dimensions of the European 
Neighbourhood Policy, Washington, D.C., World Bank, 2005. 
25   The EU has also encouraged sub-regional integration, in particular the Agadir Agreement, 
which entered into force in 2006. Intra-regional trade in the Southern Mediterranean is still 
among the lowest in the world for any region of this size.  
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fraught with politically sensitive problems, but would add flexibility to the labour market 
and relieve demographic pressures on both sides. In 2006 negotiations on the right of 
establishment have been launched, and the Commission recently envisaged further visa 
facilitation, readmission agreements and people-to-people exchanges.
26  
By contrast, the PCAs with the transition countries to the East grant no preferential 
treatment for trade. The parties basically apply most-favoured nation status to one another 
with respect to tariffs. Although most of the Eastern countries' exports currently qualify for 
the EU's autonomous Generalised System of Preferences, they still face some tariffs on 
manufactured goods. Whereas the agreements with Russia, Ukraine and Moldova feature a 
perspective of free trade (without a timetable), the PCAs with the South Caucasian 
countries – like those with the Central Asian states – embrace no such free trade 
perspective. However, in December 2006 the Commission announced its intention to 
negotiate a new generation of "deep and comprehensive free trade agreements" with all 
ENP partners, covering substantially all trade in goods and services "including those 
products of particular importance for our partners".
27 For the Eastern neighbours deep free 
trade agreements are long-term objectives, and some of them first need to join the WTO.  
Concerning financial aid, the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument 
(ENPI) has in 2007 replaced the programmes for the Mediterranean (MEDA) and the East 
(TACIS). It is endowed with €11.2 billion for 2007-2013 (compared to €8.5 billion MEDA 
and TACIS funds for 2000-2006).  
                                                 
26  European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European 
Parliament on Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy, COM(2006) 726 final, 
Brussels, 4 December 2006, pp. 4-8. 
27  Ibid., pp. 3-4. It also remedies the hitherto neglect of sub-regional integration by proposing a 
'Black Sea Synergy' initiative which aims at the EU's close association with the Black Sea 
Economic Cooperation. 
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resolution of their regional conflicts. However, the EU has up to now preferred conflict 
prevention and post-conflict management to any direct involvement in frozen or open 
conflicts and has thus provided only weak political incentives in this regard.  
Turning to deliberation, the East's medium-term perspectives for political reform 
appear more favourable than for the South. The political and economic benchmarks in the 
action plans are not simply imposed by the EU but developed in close cooperation with the 
partner countries in order to ensure ownership and commitment. There is no obligation to 
accept the acquis, although in order to participate in Community programmes and obtain 'a 
stake in the internal market', alignment with EU standards is necessary. The TAIEX 
programme provides centrally managed short-term technical assistance in the field of 
approximation, application and enforcement of legislation by sending expert advisers to a 
country or organising study visits and trainings. Progress is monitored through peer 
reviews. Twinning takes a longer-term approach. Experts from EU member states are 
seconded to partner countries in order to help countries adapt their domestic institutions 
and national administrations. The Commission also holds economic policy dialogues with 
most neighbouring countries.  
The ENP also foresees cooperation on several aspects of foreign and security policy, in 
particular an enhanced political dialogue with "the possible involvement of partner 
countries in aspects of CFSP and ESDP, conflict prevention, crisis management, the 
exchange of information, joint training and exercises and possible participation in EU-led 
crisis management operations".
28 In the framework of the ESDP, the Union has since 2004 
carried out the Rule of Law mission EUJUST THEMIS to support Georgia's reform of its 
criminal justice system, two border assistance missions at the Moldova-Ukraine border and 
                                                 
28  European Commission, Strategy Paper, op.cit., p. 13. 
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Territories (EUPOL COPPS).  
Monitoring processes and dialogues permit to directly address offenders and may 
create peer pressure if one partner is 'falling behind its neighbours'. This is even more 
important as the ENP action plans are no legal documents. 
The ENP instruments directed at political reforms face particular challenges. First of 
all, governments must be willing to modernise. The ENP cannot substitute for national 
commitments to democratise. A government's socialisation is more likely to be successful 
when domestic opposition is weak, when the political costs of adaptation are low and when 
EU norms resonate well with domestic norms in the ENP countries.
29 The Mediterranean 
region has essentially remained on the same level of democratic consolidation in spite of 
the decade-long Barcelona Process, whereas many Eastern neighbours have embarked on 
democratic reforms.
30 Therefore, there is a risk that the Mediterranean Arab countries may 
only formally adhere to European values, while their real interest is to proceed with 
economic cooperation. The Union has in fact contributed to this attitude as in the 
framework of the EMP it has never sanctioned non-compliance by its Mediterranean 
                                                 
29  Cf. Judith Kelley, "International Actors on the Domestic Scene: Membership Conditionality and 
Socialization by International Institutions", International Organization, 58(3), 2004, p. 430; 
Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier, "Governance by Conditionality: EU Rule 
Transfer to the Candidate Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", Journal of European 
Public Policy, 11(4), 2004, p. 670; Andrew P. Cortell and James W. Davis, "Understanding the 
Domestic Impact of International Norms: A Research Agenda", International Studies Review, 
2(1), 2000, p. 73. 
30    See Freedom House ratings, CEPS European Neighbourhood Watch, 23, 2007, p. 9, 
www.ceps.be/files/ NW/NWatch23.pdf (download 10.2.2007). 
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economic reforms.
31  
Unlike their Mediterranean counterparts, the Eastern ENP countries enjoy the potential 
prospect of EU membership. On the one hand, this expectation is likely to reinforce the 
countries' political will for reforms. On the other hand, experience shows that EU policy 
itself increases in consistency with an accession perspective. The EU may well turn out to 
be stricter with its Eastern than with its Southern neighbours.  
 
4. Challenges Ahead 
Even though the finalité of the ENP is not clearly defined and the policy's full potential 
has so far not been used, it offers a 'value added' compared to the status quo. For the first 
time, the Union promotes a special focus on its neighbourhood. The ENP covers a wider 
range of issues across pillars, offers increased and exclusive assistance, uses 'proven 
methodology', sets concrete priorities, closely monitors their implementation and presents 
a greater potential for tailor-made relations in the future. It can be considered part of the 
Union's still rather new 'soft diplomacy' approach which combines economic resources 
with political ambitions. While the ENP has so far been rather a Commission-driven 
policy, its strengthening will require a closer involvement of EU member states, especially 
with regard to CFSP matters.  
                                                 
31  The Union has shown a marked preference for the use of persuasion through dialogue instead of 
resorting to coercive instruments. If at all, it resorted with greater ease to negative measures 
towards marginal countries (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa) and candidates for membership (e.g. 
Central Europe and Balkans). See Rose Balfour, "Principles of Democracy and Human Rights: 
A Review of the European Union's Strategies towards its Neighbours", in Sonia Lucarelli and 
Ian Manners (eds.), Values and Principles in European Union Foreign Policy, London, 
Routledge, 2006, pp. 114-129. 
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ambition or capacity to tackle the domestic reforms required and by how serious the Union 
takes its own principles of conditionality and differentiation, that is to say, to what extent it 
will deliver real economic and political incentives and endorse its values. Deeper 
integration (removal of non-tariff barriers to trade, trade in agriculture and services, 
migration, investment, etc.) is of great interest for both Eastern and Southern ENP partners, 
but strong vested interests in the EU may prevent progress. The existence of a membership 
perspective is thereby likely to matter for the chances of success as both sides – the partner 
country and the EU – may make a greater effort.  
The emerging East-South divide may increasingly call into question the overarching 
ENP umbrella for two very different regions, in particular since the Eastern neighbours 
cherish a hidden 'membership carrot'. Moreover, in terms of legitimacy, conditionality 
seems more justified in the accession process than in a neighbourhood policy. The EU's 
approach is based on the assumption that the European model of democracy, market 
economy or regional integration can and should in fact be exported abroad. For the East 
Europeanisation means moving beyond Communist legacies and 'returning to Europe', 
whereas for the South a policy transfer from the EU may be viewed more critically a kind 
of 'neo-imperialism'. Besides, in the Southern Mediterranean the EU faces the dilemma of 
maintaining regional stability and the potentially destabilising consequences of 
encouraging pluralistic democracy, as the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian 
Authority has shown.  
For an effective implementation of the action plans, choices have to be made about 
those elements of the acquis that are fundamental to 'a stake in the internal market' and 
their proper sequencing. The vast internal market legislation was not devised for less 
developed economies. The Union in effect faces the general problem of how to prioritise 
Sieglinde Gstöhl        28among competing ENP goals such as security, good governance and economic aspirations. 
For example, individual action plans have entered into force earlier than others despite 
weaker political records. Then again, a package deal may facilitate the acceptance of 
certain reforms by ENP partners, although a 'jointly owned' process at the same time makes 
it more difficult for the EU to include elements considered unattractive by them.  
Finally, the ENP is a two-way relationship and will have (perhaps unintended) effects 
on the Union as well – closer ties with its neighbours may well transform the EU's future 
identity. And the more successful the ENP, the higher the pressure for further enlargement 
to the East. 
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Table 1: The ENP in the EU's 'pyramid of preferences' with neighbouring countries  
 
(1) internal market association   European Economic Area (Norway, Iceland, 
Liechtenstein)  
(2) customs union agreement 
- with accession perspective 
- without accession perspective 
 
Turkey 
Andorra, San Marino 
(3) free trade agreement 
- with perspective of customs union 
 
- without perspective of customs union  
   - symmetric reciprocity 
   - asymmetric reciprocity 
 
former Mediterranean association agreements 
(Cyprus, Malta, Greece, Turkey) 
 
Switzerland 
former Europe Agreements (Central and Eastern 
Europe), Euro-Mediterranean Association Agree-
ments (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, 
Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Tunisia) 
(4) partnership and cooperation  
     agreement (MFN treatment) 
- with free trade perspective 
- without free trade perspective 
 
 
Russia, Ukraine, Moldova  
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Uzbekistan  
(5) non-reciprocal trade preferences  
- with perspective of reciprocal free trade 
  
- autonomous EU preferences 
 
Stabilisation and Association Agreements  
(Croatia, Macedonia) 
Stabilisation and Association Process (W Balkans) 
 
No agreements in force yet but eligible for ENP: Belarus, Libya and Syria 
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ENP partner 
countries 
Agreement 
entry in force 
Country 
report 
Action 
plan agreed 
Adoption  
by EU 
Adoption by 
ENP country
Algeria  AA 2005  -- -- -- -- 
Armenia  PCA 1999  March 2005  autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Azerbaijan  PCA 1999  March 2005  autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Belarus    -- -- -- -- -- 
Egypt  AA 2004  March 2005  autumn 2006 06.03.2007  06.03.2007 
Georgia  PCA 1999  March 2005  autumn 2006 13.11.2006  14.11.2006 
Israel  AA 2000  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  11.04.2005 
Jordan  AA 2002  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  02.06.2005 
Lebanon  AA 2006  March 2005  autumn 2006 17.10.2006  19.01.2007 
Libya  -- -- -- -- -- 
Moldova  PCA 1998  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  22.02.2005 
Morocco  AA 2000  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  27.07.2005 
Palestinian 
Authority 
Interim AA 
1997  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  04.05.2005 
Syria  -- -- -- -- -- 
Tunisia  AA 1998  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  04.07.2005 
Ukraine  PCA 1998  May 2004  end 2004  21.02.2005  21.02.2005 
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1. 1957 - 2007 
La Chambre des représentants organise le présent débat sur les perspectives de 
l’Union européenne et ce, cinquante ans après la signature des deux traités de Rome créant, 
d’une part, la Communauté européenne sur l’énergie atomique et, d’autre part, la 
Communauté économique européenne. On se souvient que ces traités étaient le fruit d’une 
« relance » - empreinte de pragmatisme, mais de manière générale considérée comme assez 
modeste - après l’échec de l’ambitieux projet politique qu’était celui d’une Communauté 
européenne de défense. 
Ce débat prend également place cinq ans après le début des travaux de la 
Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe, travaux ayant largement contribués à l’élaboration du 
(troisième) traité de Rome instituant une « Constitution pour l’Europe ». Réfuté par les 
électeurs français et néerlandais, et bénéficiant de peu de considération de la part de 
certains gouvernements l’ayant signé en 2004, ce nouveau traité de Rome est - il faut bien 
l’admettre - peu susceptible d’entrer en vigueur. Pourtant, certains lui avaient souhaité une 
durée de vie de cinquante ans, à l’instar des traités fondateurs. 
Il n’est donc pas surprenant que l’idée d’une « relance » soit de nouveau à l’ordre 
du jour. Certains espèrent que la coïncidence de « rendez-vous historiques » avec la 
formation d’un nouveau gouvernement aux Pays-Bas mais surtout avec le prochain 
renouvellement politique en France produira un climat politique favorable à une telle 
entreprise. Par conséquent, nombreuses idées relatives à la réforme de l’Union européenne 
circulent. Les variations, considérables, entre les différentes propositions s’expliquent par 
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des perceptions divergentes quant à l’identification des problèmes à résoudre, aux remèdes 
à choisir et à leur chance d’aboutir. 
En effet, les formules actuellement discutées couvrent un champ très vaste. Celui-ci 
s’étend, sur le plan matériel, de quelques ajustements « minimalistes » des traités 
actuellement en vigueur à l’élaboration d’une version de traité constitutionnel ameillorée 
(« plus ») ; certains visent même l’adoption d’un projet politique commun innovateur et de 
grande d’envergure. Sur le plan procédural, les propositions vont d’une confection 
intergouvernementale sanctionnée par des ratifications parlementaires à une large 
consultation de la société civile, y compris la convocation d’une nouvelle Convention, 
suivie d’une consultation populaire organisée à l’échelle européenne. 
 
2. Une réforme des institutions : est-elle indispensable ? 
Vu les efforts politiques déployés pour parvenir à un accord sur le contenu du traité 
constitutionnel, d’une part, et les obstacles considérables rencontrés lors de sa ratification, 
d’autre part, on doit se demander dans quelle mesure cette réforme institutionnelle est 
indispensable. 
En effet, le projet de réforme visait, en premier lieu, à adapter les institutions à 
l’élargissement important du nombre d’Etat membres. Ceci avait en principe été réalisé en 
2000 par le traité de Nice mais nombreux étaient ceux qui considéraient ces adaptations 
comme insuffisantes. Presque trois ans après le grand élargissement, on observe toutefois 
que ce dernier ne semble pas avoir mis en danger le fonctionnement du système 
institutionnel de l’Union. Malgré certains problèmes, les institutions de l’Union sont 
capables de travailler – et de coopérer suivant les procédures de prise de décision prévus 
par le traité. Par ailleurs, il est peu probable que l’arrivée de la Roumanie et de la Bulgarie 
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changera de manière significative cette situation. Ce constat reste indépendant de la 
question de savoir si les changements prévus par le traité constitutionnel (ou à prévoir dans 
un autre traité) permettraient aux institutions de travailler de manière plus efficace que 
sous le régime actuel.  
La réforme des institutions devrait, en deuxième lieu, rendre le travail des 
institutions plus démocratique et plus transparent. Toutefois, même en supposant qu’un tel 
besoin existe et que ces objectifs soient effectivement réalisés par les réformes proposées, 
ces dernières ne sont pas indispensables pour le fonctionnement des institutions. 
 
3. Une réforme des institution : est-elle nécessaire ? 
Même si le seul fonctionnement des institutions n’impose pas une réforme 
immédiate, on doit toutefois se demander dans quelle mesure une telle réforme ne serait 
pas nécessaire. 
Les changements proposés les plus « visibles » concernent la composition et le 
fonctionnement des institutions. Or, leurs effets bénéfiques en terme d’efficacité et de 
légitimité ne sont pas certains. Un président «permanent » au Conseil européen – s’ajoutant 
à la présidence tournante du Conseil, à la présidence de la Commission et au nouveau 
ministre des affaires étrangères – ne doit pas nécessairement apporter à l’Union un « 
leadership » accru mais, au contraire, pourrait avoir l’effet opposé. Aucune des deux 
formules imaginables quant à la réforme de la Commission – réduction du nombre de ses 
membres ou renforcement de l’autorité de son président – ne permettra d’accroître son 
efficacité tant que les Etats membres ne se rendent pas à l’évidence que leur propre intérêt 
exige un renforcement de cette institution spécifique occupant une place particulière dans 
l’architecture d’ensemble. Finalement, la performance du Conseil ne semble pas dépendre 
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du choix de la formule précise utilisée pour le calcul d’une majorité qualifiée. Ces 
adaptations, bien que peut-être utiles, ne nous nous semblent donc pas forcément 
nécessaires. 
Il en va sans doute de même pour les arrangements institutionnels visant au 
renforcement de l’action externe de l’Union. Ces arrangements sont bâtis sur un certain 
réalisme puisqu’ils maintiennent dans une large mesure les prérogatives nationales en la 
matière. On peut se demander si la création d’un ministre des affaires étrangères – 
réunissant à la fois les fonctions de Haut représentant des affaires étrangères en charge de 
la présidence du Conseil « affaires extérieures », et les fonctions de vice-président de la 
Commission – contribuera à des concurrences interinstitutionnelles accrues ou, comme 
l’espèrent ces auteurs, au développement progressif d’une politique extérieure cohérente de 
l’Union. Ceci dépendra probablement d’une autre question, également envisagée par le 
traité constitutionnel : la création progressive, et si nécessaire avec le concours d’un 
nombre limité d’Etats membres, de forces de frappe communes et d’un système 
d’armement intégré. Or, il semble qu’une telle approche « graduelle » pourrait également 
se réaliser sur base des dispositions en vigueur : l’agence d’armement a déjà été établie et 
les préparatifs pour des forces de frappe « à géométrie variable » sont également déjà en 
cours. 
D’autres innovations inscrites dans le traité constitutionnel pourraient également 
être considérées comme souhaitables sans pourtant être forcément nécessaires. Il s’agit ici 
notamment de la réorganisation des traités existants en un traité unique, divisé en quatre 
parties, en vue d’en souligner la portée constitutionnelle. Il en va de même pour l’ensemble 
des dispositions visant à codifier les aspects constitutionnels des traités déjà en vigueur, 
tels qu’interprétés par le juge communautaire. Ceci vaut aussi pour l’insertion de la Charte 
des droits fondamentaux - nettement moins innovatrice que certains ont voulu le croire -, 
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pour la classification purement descriptive des compétences ou encore pour la nouvelle 
dénomination des actes de l’Union. Même la clause de sécession, allant bien au-delà de ce 
qui a été communément reconnu aux Etats membre en la matière, ne consacre en effet 
qu’une réalité politique : l’on voit mal comment obliger un Etat de demeurer contre son gré 
dans l’Union. 
Certaines réformes, non sans importance, ont déjà été réalisées sur base du traité de 
Nice. Il s’agit notamment du droit accordé au Parlement de revoir des actes législatifs 
délégués à la Commission et des règles relatives à la transparence des travaux du Conseil 
lorsqu’il agit en tant que législateur. Aussi l’obligation imposée à la Commission 
d’examiner des initiatives populaires signées par un million de citoyens pourrait 
parfaitement figurer dans un accord interinstitutionnel. 
Le mécanisme d’alerte permettant à un certain nombre de parlements nationaux 
d’obliger la Commission à réexaminer une proposition législative a trait à un problème 
important. La cause de celui-ci se situe pourtant à un niveau national, comme l’indique 
l’expérience de certains Etats membres où les parlements réalisent depuis de nombreuses 
années un contrôle efficace du processus législatif communautaire. Il s’ensuit qu’un tel « 
screening » peut parfaitement se faire sans l’établissement d’un mécanisme communautaire 
spécifique, surtout si les efforts nationaux sont ensuite coordonnés au niveau européen 
(Cosac). Un tel contrôle est d’ailleurs indispensable et doit se développer davantage dans 
les domaines pour lesquels le Parlement européen dispose de pouvoirs limités, notamment 
la PESC. 
Si l’implication des parlements nationaux semble être essentielle et ce, sans 
pourtant requérir une révision des traités, d’autres réformes nécessaires ne peuvent être 
réalisées sans une modification du droit primaire. Il s’agit en premier lieu de l’élimination 
des droits de veto au sein du Conseil au profit d’un vote à la majorité (sur-)qualifiée, de 
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l’extension de la procédure de codécision au profit du Parlement européen et du contrôle 
judiciaire par le juge communautaire. Le traité constitutionnel propose des avancées réelles 
dans les politiques sensibles visant la création de « l’espace de liberté de sécurité et de 
justice » moyennant une coopération policière et judiciaire dans le domaine pénal (ne 
pouvant pas entièrement être réalisées par l’utilisation de la clause de passerelle inscrite à 
l’article 42 du traité UE). Il ne procède toutefois pas à une communautarisation complète 
de tous les domaines de l’intégration, ni à une élimination du droit de veto au sein du 
Conseil – car un tel changement ne fait pas l’unanimité parmi les Etats membres.  
Finalement - et le sort probable du traité constitutionnel n’adressant pas ce 
problème de manière décisive le démontre bien -, il semble inacceptable qu’aucune 
modification des traités ne puisse se réaliser sans l’approbation unanime de tous les Etats 
membres. Deux solutions sont envisageables : soit l’introduction d’une procédure 
permettant une révision à la majorité, combinée à une clause de sortie pour les Etats 
n’ayant pas accepté la réforme, soit l’insertion de clauses permettant des coopérations 
renforcées soumises à des conditions nettement moins strictes que sous le régime actuel. 
Néanmoins, aucune de ces deux possibilités ne sera probablement réalisable. 
 
4. Une réforme des institutions : est-elle réalisable ? 
Il semble, d’une part, que les réformes institutionnelles sur lesquelles les Etats 
membres peuvent s’accorder en surmontant toutefois de grands difficultés ne sont pas pour 
la plupart ni indispensables ni forcément nécessaires. D’autre part, les réformes nécessaires 
ne feront très probablement pas l’unanimité et ne sont donc pas réalisables à terme. 
Dominik Hanf   
  
37 
5. Une nouvelle relance ? 
Les comparaisons historiques ne sont que rarement exactes et il serait certainement 
erroné de vouloir comparer la situation ayant menée à la signature du traité CEE à celle se 
présentant aujourd’hui. Une des maintes différences qui s’opposent à un tel procédé est liée 
à la nature même des traités de Rome de 1957 et de 2004. Dans les années cinquante, il 
s’agissait de faire face à l’échec d’un projet d’intégration précis, une politique de défense 
commune, en lançant un nouveau projet visant à unifier les économies nationales des Etats 
fondateurs. Aujourd’hui, l’échec ne concerne pas un projet d’intégration concret 
nécessitant la création ou l’amélioration de structures institutionnelles : le traité 
constitutionnel vise avant tout à une rationalisation des institutions et des mécanismes de 
prise de décision déjà existants. La plupart des projets de « relance » avancés dans le débat 
actuel ne vont pas au-delà de cette limite. Or, l’histoire de l’intégration européenne nous 
enseigne que des avancées sur le plan institutionnel ont toujours été indiquées par des 
projets tangibles – le marché commun en 1957, sa réaffirmation par l’acte unique en 1986, 
l’Union monétaire en 1992 et peut-être même encore le projet d’un espace de liberté, 
sécurité et justice en 1997. 
Il est donc difficile de qualifier de « relance » une tentative de réforme 
institutionnelle sans rapport visible et direct avec un objectif concret, nouveau ou 
réaffirmé. Ceci peut paraître injuste dans la mesure où la réalisation de tout objectif 
commun d’intégration dépend largement d’un système institutionnel capable de produire, 
de manière efficace, des décisions considérées comme étant légitimes. Mais en réalité, les 
questions institutionnelles sont des problèmes relatifs à la réalisation de certains buts ; 
détachées de ces derniers, elles génèrent trop souvent soit l’indifférence soit la méfiance. 
Le sort des tentatives de réforme à caractère institutionnel, certes ambitieux et 
remarquables mais toutefois jamais réalisées, semble confirmer ce constat. 
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Il s’ensuit que l’on doit probablement revenir aux leçons des années cinquante. L’échec de 
la Communauté européenne de défense a donné lieu aux traités de Rome de 1957, le projet 
de Constitution de 1984 a eu un impact important sur l’élaboration de l’Acte unique. On 
peut espérer que l’expérience du traité constitutionnel de 2004 ouvrira la voie à une relance 
similaire. Ceci demande toutefois que l’on se détache des débats purement institutionnels. 
En poursuivant les idées publiées par l’actuel premier ministre belge et, plus 
récemment, par l’ancien député européen Ph. Herzog, les dirigeants politiques désireux de 
« relancer » le processus de l’intégration devront réfléchir à la réalisation des projets 
d’intégration matériels « porteurs » - sans hésiter à les poursuivre, au moins dans un 
premier temps, avec le concours d’un nombre restreint d’Etats et, si nécessaire, en marge 
des traités. 
 
6. Thèses à discuter : 
1.  Le traité constitutionnel signé, en 2004, à Rome ne sera pas ratifié 
par tous les Etats membres et n’entrera, par conséquent, pas en vigueur. 
2.  La réforme que certains souhaitent relancer se limite à la réforme 
des institutions. Une telle réforme est certainement importante et utile mais 
n’implique pas – ou qu’indirectement – une « relance » du processus d’intégration 
comparable aux traités fondateurs, l’Acte unique, les traités de Maastricht et 
d’Amsterdam. 
3.  Une vraie « relance » impliquerait l’établissement de nouveaux 
objectifs d’intégration – accompagné des mécanismes institutionnels correspondants. 
En substance, il s’agirait de créer un programme visant, sur le plan économique, 
certains des objectifs établis dans le cadre du « processus de Lisbonne » et sur le plan 
Dominik Hanf   
  
39 
politique, la défense commune déjà visée en 1952. Aussi le projet de marché 
intérieur de l’énergie devrait être examiné en profondeur en raison de ses enjeux 
économiques, écologiques et sécuritaires. A l’instar des expériences du passé, un tel 
programme devra être accompagné d’une date butoir et prévoir des possibilités de 
différenciation. 
4.  Une réforme institutionnelle, visant à rendre les mécanismes de prise 
de décision plus efficaces, démocratiques et transparents, ne semble pas être 
indispensable à l’heure actuelle pour le fonctionnement de l’Union. 
5.  Parmi les réformes institutionnelles inscrites dans le traité 
constitutionnel, maintes sont utiles et même souhaitables – mais peu sont réellement 
nécessaires : il s’agit surtout des cas dans lesquels (i.) le droit de veto au sein du 
Conseil est éliminé au profit d’un vote à la majorité (même surqualifiée), (ii.) les 
droits de codécision du Parlement européen et (iii.) la juridiction de la Cour de 
justice sont étendus. 
6.  Il s’ensuit qu’une réforme institutionnelle conséquente pour une 
Union élargie visant à la fois à l’efficacité et à la légitimité de son action devrait 
systématiquement étendre la mode de prise de décision communautaire sur 
l’ensemble des activités des institutions communes tout en généralisant la prise de 
décision à la majorité (sur-)qualifiée au sein du Conseil. 
7.  Une telle réforme devrait inclure une procédure de révision des 
traités permettant à dépasser des blocages découlant de l’opposition d’une minorité 
d’Etats membres. 
8.  Tant que des projets de réforme institutionnelle dignes de se nom ne 
sont pas politiquement réalisables, il convient de progresser suivant la méthode 
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fonctionnelle classique. Ceci peut – et doit même – inclure des coopérations entre 
Etats volontaires à l’extérieur des traités. 
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